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641 
MAX MOSLEY AND THE ENGLISH  
RIGHT TO PRIVACY 
INTRODUCTION 
On March 30, 2008, the British weekly tabloid News of the World 
published a characteristically scandalous and salacious piece of 
journalism.
1
 Entitled ―F1 Boss Has Sick Nazi Orgy with Hookers,‖2 the 
article described the participation of Max Mosley,
3
 then-President of the 
Fédération Internationale de l‘Automobile (―FIA‖)4 in a sado-masochistic 
orgy with multiple prostitutes.
5
 The article was accompanied by images of 
the alleged orgy, and News of the World‘s website simultaneously 
published the print edition‘s content along with edited video footage of the 
sex acts.
6
 A follow-up story ran on April 6, 2008, in which one of the 
women involved in the sex acts was interviewed by the newspaper. 
 
 
 1. The News of the World was notorious for its invasive investigative reports, especially those 
focused on celebrities. As one of Britain‘s ―Red Top‖ tabloid newspapers (so-called for their flashy 
red mastheads), it focused primarily on entertainment news. And with a circulation around three 
million people, it was one of the most widely read English newspapers. Mark Sweney, News of the 
World Bucks Sunday Red-Top Trend with Slight Rise, GUARDIAN (UK), Oct. 16, 2009, http://www. 
guardian.co.uk/media/2009/oct/16/abcs-sunday-mid-market-newspapers. 
 2. Mosley v. News Group Newspapers Ltd., [2008] EWHC (QB) 1777, [2] (Eng.). 
 3. Max Mosley is prominent in his own right as a world sports figurehead. However, his 
celebrity is magnified by his identity as the scion of one of Great Britain‘s most notorious political 
families. His father, Sir Oswald Mosley, served as the leader of the British Union of Fascists and his 
mother, Diana Mitford, was one of the infamous Mitford sisters, well-known for their involvement 
with the luminaries and villains of twentieth century Europe. Mitford was a proud intimate of notable 
fascist leaders such as Adolf Hitler and General Francisco Franco; indeed, the only guests at her 
wedding ceremony to Sir Oswald aside from the witnesses were Nazi propaganda minister Joseph 
Goebbels and Hitler himself. PHILLIP REES, BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY OF THE EXTREME RIGHT 
SINCE 1890, 269–70 (1990). See also Ashling O‘Connor & Ed Gorman, Mosley‟s Son Faces Calls to 
Quit As Formula One Chief After „Nazi‟ Orgy, TIMES (LONDON), Mar. 31, 2008, at 5. Mosley has 
largely avoided politics because of his name, but this family history and a past unwillingness to truly 
distance himself from the views of his parents certainly made the allegations of a ―Nazi-theme‖ orgy 
all the more damaging to his public reputation. Geoffrey Levy, Shadow of the Father, DAILY MAIL 
(UK), Apr. 2, 2008, at 22. See also Caroline Gammell, Profile Max Mosley, DAILY TELEGRAPH (UK), 
July 25, 2008, at 4 (reporting Mosley‘s court testimony that ―[a]ll my life I have had hanging over me 
my antecedents, my parents.‖). The News of the World sought to make the most of Mosley‘s family 
history, boasting that the story contained ―all that‘s decent to print on the episode that disgraced even 
HIS family‘s shame-drenched name.‖ Mosley, [2008] EWHC (QB) 1777, [40]. 
 4. The FIA is the nonprofit organization that operates as the governing body for world motor 
sport, administering the rules and regulations for Formula One racing. Mosley served as president of 
the organization from 1993 until October 23, 2009, when Jean Todt won the FIA presidency in a 
lopsided victory after being backed by the retiring Mosley. Ian Parkes, Join Me: New FIA Chief Todt 
Wins Landslide, DAILY POST (LIVERPOOL), Oct. 24, 2009, at 29. 
 5. Mosley, [2008] EWHC (QB) 1777, [4]. 
 6. Id. at [2]. 
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After a failed attempt at an injunction,
7
 Mosley predictably filed suit 
for damages against News Group Newspapers Ltd., the publisher of News 
of the World. However, his initial suit was not one for defamation or libel 
because the allegations in the story were, for the most part, factually 
correct.
8
 Instead, Mosley alleged both ―breach of confidence and/or the 
unauthorised disclosure of personal information,‖9 and claimed the latter 
offense had infringed his ―rights of privacy as protected by Article 8 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms‖ 
(―Convention‖).10 For these alleged abuses, Mosley sought exemplary11 
and compensatory damages.
12
 
Columnists in the English press were noticeably anxious about the 
nature of Mosley‘s claims. Upon seeing the grounds for the lawsuit, a few 
commentators went so far as to characterize Mosley‘s suit as a major 
threat to press freedom.
13
 The claim of breach of confidence was common 
enough, but the principal reason for the apprehension was Mosley‘s 
insistence that his ―rights of privacy‖ had been violated. To recognize this 
claim, journalists opined, would be contrary to the history and spirit of 
 
 
 7. Mosley v. News Group Newspapers (Mosley Injunction Request), [2008] EWHC (QB) 687. 
 8. Truth, or ―justification,‖ of course, remains a defense for libel under both American and 
English law. See Reynolds v. Times Newspapers Ltd, [1999] UKHL 45, [1999] 4 All E.R. 609, x 
(―Truth is a complete defence. If the defendant proves the substantial truth of the words complained of, 
he thereby establishes the defence of justification.‖). Ultimately, Mosley did not dispute the basic truth 
of the News of the World‘s claims with this lawsuit. He admitted to engaging in S&M role-playing and 
that he had paid the women £500 each for their services. Graham Tibbetts, Mosley Admits Passion for 
S&M Sex But Denies Nazi Role-Playing, DAILY TELEGRAPH (UK), July 7, 2008, at 9. However, some 
of the women involved stated that they often engaged in sexual activity of this kind for free and 
disputed their characterization as ―prostitutes.‖ Mosley, [2008] EWHC (QB) 1777, [121]. The Mosley 
decision also addressed a key factual error in the News of the World‟s reporting which could have been 
the basis for a defamation suit. It was determined in the opinion that the orgy might have had a 
―German military‖ or prison camp theme, but not the specifically ―Nazi theme‖ alleged by the News of 
the World. Mosley, [2008] EWHC (QB) 1777, [161], [170]. Mosley subsequently seized on this factual 
determination in bringing a libel suit against the News of the World on March 30, 2009. Oliver Luft, 
Max Mosley Launches Libel Action Against News of the World, GUARDIAN (UK), Apr. 3, 2009, http:// 
www.guardian.co.uk/media/2009/apr/03/max-mosley-news-of-the-world. 
 9. Mosley, [2008] EWHC (QB) 1777, [3]. 
 10. Id. Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights, incorporated into English law 
through the Human Rights Act of 1998, provides that ―[e]veryone has the right to respect for his 
private and family life, his home and his correspondence.‖ European Convention on Human Rights, 
§ 1, art. 8, Nov. 4, 1950. 
 11. ―Exemplary damages‖ is the commonly used term for punitive damages in the U.K. The two 
terms are essentially synonymous. See BLACK‘S LAW DICTIONARY 418–19 (8th ed. 2004). 
 12. Mosley, [2008] EWHC (QB) 1777, [173]. 
 13. See, e.g., Stephen Glover, Privacy v Morality, DAILY MAIL (UK), July 12, 2008, at 16 (―Even 
accepting the paper‘s many failings, I believe [a ruling for Mosley] would be a disastrous outcome for 
. . . freedom of the Press.‖); Giles Hattersley, Bend Over, Free Speech, This Is Going to Hurt, SUNDAY 
TIMES (LONDON), July 13, 2008, at 13 (discussing the potential ―chilling effect‖ of Mosley‘s victory 
and listing stories that would be potentially barred from publication if Mosley were to win). 
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English law.
14
 After all, less than five years had passed since the House of 
Lords flatly rejected the ―previously unknown tort of invasion of privacy‖ 
as a cause of action.
15
 During the run-up to the decision in Mosley, there 
was thus much discussion of a potential landmark privacy ruling.
16
 As the 
trial progressed, the major theme of the Mosley v. News Group 
Newspapers Ltd. coverage shifted from the salacious facts being tittered 
about in court
17
 to whether the outcome would substantially change 
English law.
18
 Specifically, the issue became how the press could treat 
private information, especially in the context of a celebrity exposé. 
On July 24, 2008, Mr. Justice David Eady
19
 of the Queen‘s Bench 
delivered the judgment of the court. The court held that Article 8 of the 
 
 
 14. See, e.g., Hattersley, supra note 13 (―Britain has never had a right to privacy.‖); Graham 
Shear & Alison Green, Is This the End of the Kiss-and-Tell?, TIMES (LONDON), May 13, 2008, at 1 
(―Traditionally, the UK had no separate right of privacy.‖). Indeed, there was a great deal of weight to 
this basic assertion, for as this Note explores below, both Parliament and the English judiciary had 
repeatedly and explicitly rejected any distinct right to privacy before 2000. Mosley indicated some 
awareness of this fact by simultaneously filing suit in France, where the laws regarding privacy and 
defamation were historically more favorable to claimants. Nick Armstrong, Legal Opinion: Max 
Mosley Goes Forum Shopping in Paris, INDEPENDENT (UK), June 4, 2008, at 32 (noting that French 
privacy law is ―stricter and more efficient than in England,‖ offers criminal penalties, and that in 
France, Mosley ―stands a greater chance of [the judgment] being in his favour than in London‖). 
 15. Wainwright v. Home Office, [2001] EWCA (Civ) 2081, [2003] 3 All E.R. 943. 
 16. See, e.g., John F. Burns, Decision Is Near in Sensational London Trial of Privacy Suit by a 
Consenting Adult, N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 2008, at A12 (―The outcome of the case is expected to be a 
legal landmark.‖); Ian Burrell, Ze Fine Line Between Privacy and Free Speech, INDEPENDENT (UK), 
July 7, 2008, at 12 (characterizing the case as ―the frontline in a legal battle for freedom of expression‖ 
and quoting a journalism professor‘s opinion that ―[t]his is a landmark case and journalism has 
everything to fear—and not just tabloid journalism‖). 
 17. Jenni Murray, Nothing Beats a Good Sex Scandal, OBSERVER (LONDON), July 13, 2008, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2008/jul/13/pressandpublishing.privacy (observing that the 
female witnesses ―could hardly suppress their giggles in the witness box‖). 
 18. See Burrell, supra note 16 ([T]here is little laughter in the ranks of the British media, where 
the realisation of the potential implications of this case is beginning to take hold.‖); Hattersley, supra 
note 13 (opining that the trial would ―indeed be funny, if it weren‘t so serious‖ and that the real issue 
was ―the right to privacy versus freedom of expression‖); see also Shane Hegarty, Flogging Press 
Freedom, IRISH TIMES, July 12, 2008, at 2 (―[T]he press‘s motivation for reporting the case lies not 
just in its mix of titillation, prurience and old-fashioned British sex comedy, but because the 
whippings, Luftwaffe uniforms and bloody bottoms are the ingredients of a trial that could seriously 
alter British press freedoms and trigger further cases.‖); David Rawlinson, Opinion: David Rawlinson 
on the Max Mosley Case, DAILY POST (LIVERPOOL), July 29, 2008, at 14 (―[T]he fact that Mr. Mosley 
pursued an action of breach of privacy has fascinated readers almost as much as the allegations.‖). 
 19. Eady is the most senior High Court judge and hears the majority of the Court‘s high-profile 
libel and confidentiality cases. Having Eady preside over the case added an additional degree of 
controversy because of the press‘s perception of his involvement in the crafting of an English right to 
privacy. In fact, even before Mosley, he had come under some media scrutiny for decisions in high 
profile libel and confidentiality cases. See Stephen Glover, Judges‟ Decisions Need Careful Scrutiny to 
Protect a Free Press, INDEPENDENT (UK), May 20, 2007, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/media/ 
opinion/stephen-glover/stephen-glover-on-the-press-449696.html (characterizing Justice Eady as ―a 
threat to a free Press‖ and predicting future controversial decisions from him); Robert Spencer, 
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Convention mandated the protection of a privacy interest distinct from 
traditional breach of confidentiality and that News of the World violated 
this right.
20
 In its decision, the court relied on a number of recent cases that 
helped establish this right.
21
 It also ruled that the paper‘s allegations of a 
Nazi theme were incorrect based on the record, and that there was thus no 
public interest in the story to overcome protection of Mosley‘s right to 
privacy.
22
 The court stopped short of awarding exemplary damages, but 
did award £60,000 in compensatory damages,
23
 a record amount for an 
action asserting a right to privacy, and payment of Mosley‘s attorneys 
fees, estimated to be around £450,000.
24
 
The announcement of the decision gained the full attention of the press 
worldwide.
25
 Despite the court‘s assertion that this was not a ―landmark‖ 
 
 
Battling Censorship: Speak Up and Speak Out, WASH. TIMES, July 20, 2007, at A19 (noting in an op-
ed that a plaintiff ―had the good fortune of having the case heard by Judge David Eady, who has a long 
history of strange rulings in libel cases - rulings that generally ran in favor of censorship and against 
free speech‖). Due to this role in the expansion of confidentiality and interpretation of the Human 
Rights Act, Eady received an unusual amount of negative personal attention from the media during the 
Mosley case, much of it characterizing him as the primary architect of modern English privacy law. 
See, e.g. Frances Gibb, Lawyer Who Used to Act for the Red-Tops Became Judge Who Championed 
Privacy, TIMES (LONDON), July 25, 2008, at 21 (―By his own admission, his rulings have not made 
him popular and he has ‗come in for quite a bit of stick.‘‖); Profile, Mr. Justice Eady, Defender of the 
Nation‟s Privacy, DAILY TELEGRAPH (UK), Nov. 13, 2008, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/ 
newstopics/profiles/3453978/Profile-Mr-Justice-Eady-defender-of-the-nations-privacy.html (―The 
judge‘s critics argue that he has introduced his own ‗Eady‘s law‘ of privacy by repeatedly ruling 
against newspapers and building up a formidable body of case law on which public figures can rely 
when they wish to gag the media.‖); Quentin Letts, Mr. Justice Eady Profile: As Cold As a Frozen 
Haddock, He Hands Down His Views Shorn of Moral Balance, DAILY MAIL (UK), July 25, 2008, at 6 
(arguing in an op-ed piece that these decisions are ―too important, surely, to be left in the hands of one 
distinctly single-minded member of the judiciary‖). The grounds for this skepticism were not 
altogether unfounded, as some of the opinions Eady cited as precedent in his decision were in fact ones 
he had authored. See Burrell, supra note 16 (summarizing Eady‘s past privacy decisions). 
Nevertheless, some of the journalism—most notably the Letts piece—is provocatively critical of 
Eady‘s jurisprudence in the privacy cases, and also provides a number of details about the judge‘s own 
private life. Regardless of one‘s sentiments on the matter, the irony in publishing a searching inquiry 
and critique discussing the personal life of a judge who has just presided over a major privacy case 
should be appreciated. 
 20. Mosley, [2008] EWHC 1777 [99]. 
 21. Id. at [9], [14], [18]. 
 22. Id. at [134]. 
 23. Id. at [236]. 
 24. Helen Pidd, Punishment That Was Not a Crime: Why Mosley Won in the High Court, 
GUARDIAN (UK), July 25, 2008, at 4. Indeed, the total cost of the lawsuit to the News of the World was 
in excess of £900,000 and may have approached £1 million. Stephen Brook, Max Mosley Privacy Case 
Cost News of the World Almost £1m, Editor Tells MPs, GUARDIAN (UK), May 5, 2009, http://www. 
guardian.co.uk/media/2009/may/05/max-mosley-colin-myler.  
 25. William Lee Adams, Mosley‟s Win: No „Nazis‟ at the Orgy, TIME, July 24, 2008, http:// 
www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1826232,00.html; John F. Burns, British Judge Rules 
Tabloid Report Tying Grand Prix Boss to „Orgy‟ Violated Privacy, N.Y. TIMES, July 25, 2008, at A6; 
Ben Farmer, Andrew Pierce & Caroline Gammell, Max Mosley Wins Record Privacy Damages Over 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol10/iss3/7
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decision,
26
 a great number of stories labeled the ruling as such.
27
 
Unsurprisingly, much of the coverage and commentary was negative, as 
vocal journalists, citing concerns for the survival of their industry, 
complained of a judicially created right that effectively allowed the rich to 
gag the press at their leisure.
28
 
Indeed, Mosley marked a landmark moment for the English right to 
privacy for several reasons, which this Note explores in four sections. Part 
I illustrates how Mosley‘s recovery for invasion of privacy is at odds with 
centuries of English common law and marks the triumph of a movement 
that has circumvented prior judicial and legislative refusals to recognize 
such a stand-alone right. Part II explains how, despite England‘s long 
history of denying a privacy tort‘s existence, the last ten years have seen 
the necessary emergence and evolution of a de facto right to privacy under 
the influence of the European Convention on Human Rights. Part III 
analyzes the Mosley opinion itself: how it drew upon recent precedent, 
how it extends that precedent, and how it crystallizes the balancing test for 
 
 
News of the World Nazi Orgy Slur, DAILY TELEGRAPH (UK), July 24, 2008, http://www.telegraph.co. 
uk/news/majornews/2455092/Max-Mosely-wins-record-privacy-damages-over-News-of-the-World-
Nazi-orgy-slur.html; Andrew Pierce, It May Be Perverted But It‟s None of Our Business, NEW 
ZEALAND HERALD, July 26, 2008, at A28; Hasan Suroor, In Brown‟s Britain, No News Is Good News, 
THE HINDU, July 28, 2008, at 10; John F. Burns, Racing Chief Wins British Privacy Trial, INT‘L 
HERALD TRIBUNE, Jul. 25, 2008, at 3. 
 26. Recognizing the controversy surrounding his ruling, Eady took great pains to couch his 
decision as one guided by precedent: ―It is perhaps worth adding that there is nothing ‗landmark‘ about 
this decision . . . . [i]t is simply the application to rather unusual facts of recently developed but 
established principles.‖ Mosley, [2008] EWHC (QB) 1777, [234]. 
 27. See, e.g., Paul Harris, What Price Morality, DAILY MAIL, July 25, 2008, at 1 (―The ruling 
was being seen last night as a landmark in allowing highly restrictive privacy legislation to creep in 
from Europe, although Mr. Justice Eady said his decision would not inhibit investigative journalism in 
the public interest.‖); Suroor, supra note 25 (characterizing it as ―a landmark judgment which, if it 
were to become a precedent, could drive many British newspapers out of business‖). Indeed, many 
directly challenged the court‘s assertion, with The Times opining that ―Mr Eady was quite wrong to 
claim that ―there is nothing ‗landmark‘ about this decision‖ and that in fact ―[t]he finding has long-
term consequences, both for English law and for British journalism.‖ Comment, The Mosley Judgment, 
TIMES (LONDON), July 25, 2008, at 2. 
 28. See The Mosley Judgment, supra note 27, at 2 (suggesting that privacy has surpassed libel 
and ―may prove the bigger hurdle in reporting complicated matters of public interest‖); William 
Underhill, Sex, Privacy, and Max Mosley, NEWSWEEK, July 24, 2008, http://www.newsweek.com/id/ 
148617 (transcribing an interview with Stephen Rigley, News Editor of the Sunday Express, in which 
he calls the decision ―a black day for the freedom of the press in Britain‖). Perhaps the best and most 
extreme example of the press outrage sparked by the decision was a public speech given by The Daily 
Mail‘s Editor in Chief, Paul Dacre. In an impassioned attack on the Mosley ruling, Dacre slammed 
Eady‘s privacy decisions as ―arrogant and amoral judgments,‖ which were allowing ―the corrupt and 
the crooked to sleep easily in their beds‖ while ―undermining the ability of mass-circulation 
newspapers to sell newspapers in an ever more difficult market.‖ Oliver Luft, Daily Mail Editor-in-
Chief Paul Dacre Criticises BBC Growth and Privacy Rulings, GUARDIAN (UK), Nov. 10, 2008, http: 
//www.guardian.co.uk/media/2008/nov/10/pauldacre-dailymail. 
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privacy interests going forward. This section will argue that Mosley itself 
is an atypical ―landmark‖ case because the heavy lifting for the decision 
had been done in earlier cases. It will also demonstrate that the holding of 
Mosley does not present as grave a threat to the press as the media 
claimed. Finally, Part IV addresses what may eventually be the lasting 
legacy of Mosley‘s case: his recent failed appeal to the European Court of 
Human Rights in Mosley v. United Kingdom.
29
. In this section, I argue that 
the Mosley decision in the English court ought to be the furthest extent of 
this new right to privacy, and that the Court of Human Rights recognized 
this in its recent opinion. Part IV concludes by discussing some of the 
dangers of Mosley‘s demand for a system of prior notification and why the 
court rejected such a requirement. 
I. THE HISTORICAL REJECTION OF PRIVACY AND RELIANCE ON 
CONFIDENTIALITY LAW 
The Mosley opinion relied on precedent in protecting a right to privacy, 
but even the court admitted that its guiding doctrine was ―recently 
developed.‖30 Indeed, from a more expansive vantage point, the right 
recognized and protected in Mosley is a very novel one. English law 
historically rejected the recognition of a distinct ―right to privacy.‖31 Until 
recently, this held true for both Parliament and the judiciary.
32
 This is not 
to say that ―privacy‖ as an interest was never protected, it was simply 
never considered a stand-alone right, especially insofar as the ―right to 
privacy‖ is understood to be ―the interest in controlling the disclosure of 
public information about oneself.‖33 When faced with allegations of an 
invasion of personal privacy, English courts traditionally allowed recovery 
only if the claim came in conjunction with the assertion of a more 
 
 
 29. Mosley v. United Kingdom, App. No. 48009/08, European Court of Human Rights, 
Statement of Facts (2009), http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?action=html&documentId= 
857906&portal=hbkm&source=externalbydocnumber&table=F69A27FD8FB86142BF01C1166DEA3
98649. For more information about the pending suit, see Steeles Law Firm Press Release, Max Mosley 
Application to the European Court of Human Rights, Oct. 6, 2008, http://www.steeleslaw.co.uk/news-
item.aspx?id=5d0129b9-7300-4df5-a73b-150124e6c507; Peter Burden, Revenge of the Named and 
Shamed, SUNDAY INDEPENDENT (UK), Jan. 11, 2009, at 26 (discussing Mosley‘s plan to sue the 
government in the ECHR). 
 30. Mosley, [2008] EWHC (QB) 1777, [234]. 
 31. Alec Samuels, Privacy: Statutorily Definable?, 17 STAT. L. REV. 115, 115 n.1 (1996). 
 32. Gerald Dworkin, The Younger Committee Report on Privacy, 36 MOD. L. REV. 399, 399 
(1973). 
 33. Helen Fenwick & Gavin Phillipson, Confidence and Privacy: A Re-Examination, 55 
CAMBRIDGE L.J. 447, 447 n.4 (1996). 
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established right.
34
 These included, but were not limited to, the equitable 
remedy of breach of confidence, several torts related to intentional 
infliction of personal harm, and the principles governing the appropriate 
use of police powers.
35
 Of these indirect protections for privacy, 
confidence was the path most frequently traversed.
36
 
The English breach of confidence tort has its foundation in the 1849 
case of Prince Albert v. Strange.
37
 In Prince Albert, William Strange came 
into possession of etchings and drawings that Queen Victoria and her 
husband, Prince Albert, had made of the royal family.
38
 The court enjoined 
his attempts to sell a catalog based on the etchings under the theory that 
his possession ―originated in a breach of trust, confidence, or contract‖ by 
the clerk of the royal printer, and that the duty of confidentiality owed by 
the clerk to the Queen and Prince extended to subsequent holders of the 
etchings.
39
 Although Prince Albert was not actually the first breach of 
confidence case,
40
 its fundamentality to the doctrine has gone 
unquestioned because it provides perhaps the clearest example of a case 
relying on a theory of confidence, it involves famous plaintiffs, and it 
extended the doctrine to cover breaches by third parties.
41
 
The modern English confidence tort saw its most lucid articulation in 
the 1969 case of Coco v. Clark.
42
 In Coco, the court declared three 
elements necessary for the formulation of a breach of confidence claim: 
(1) the information had to have ―the necessary quality of confidence about 
it‖; (2) it must have ―been imparted in circumstances importing an 
 
 
 34. James K. Weeks, Comparative Law of Privacy, 12 CLEV.-MARSHALL L. REV. 484, 484–85 
(1963). Weeks categorized a number of cases and concluded that: 
Where privacy, which is the right of seclusion as to one‘s name, person, or representation of 
self, is associated with an action for libel or slander, copyright infringement, breach of 
contract, trespass, assault and battery, or similar type of action, the Anglo-American courts 
seem perfectly willing as a gratuitous bonus, to grant it protection. It is only where this right 
to seclusion stands naked and alone that many Anglo-American courts, and particularly the 
English, have encountered extreme difficulty in bringing themselves to recognize such a right, 
and allow a remedy for that alone. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Lauren B. Cardonsky, Note, Towards a Meaningful Right to Privacy in the United Kingdom, 
20 B.U. INT‘L L.J. 393, 399 (2002). 
 37. (1849) 41 Eng. Rep. 1171 (Ch.).  
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
 40. See, e.g., Abernethy v. Hutchinson, (1825) 26 Eng. Rep. 1313 (Ch.); Yovatt v. Winyard, 
(1820) 37 Eng. Rep. 425 (Ch.); Duke of Queensbury v. Shebbeare, (1758) 28 Eng. Rep. 924, 924 
(Ch.). For a more comprehensive summary of the evolution of the law of confidentiality, see Neil M. 
Richards & Daniel J. Solove, Privacy‟s Other Path: Recovering the Law of Confidentiality, 96 GEO. 
L.J. 123, 134–38 (2007). 
 41. Id. at 160. 
 42. [1969] R.P.C. 41 (UK). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
648 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY GLOBAL STUDIES LAW REVIEW [VOL. 10:641 
 
 
 
 
obligation of confidence‖; and (3) there must have been ―unauthorised use 
of that information to the detriment of the party communicating it.‖43 
Since then, scholars have praised the adaptability and practicality of 
protecting privacy interests through confidentiality.
44
 Because this 
approach focuses on the nature of the relationship between the parties and 
not on the nature of the information itself, it has some distinct advantages 
over the traditional American or European right to privacy.
45
  
However, the unsatisfactory nature of confidence, especially its failure 
to adequately protect against public disclosure of private facts not 
imparted to another, has also been long noted and lamented by scholars of 
English law.
46
 Because of confidentiality‘s traditional focus on prior 
 
 
 43. Id. at 46. As this formulation demonstrates, the breach of confidentiality claim was not 
designed at the outset to protect private information that was obtained by unfamiliar third parties. 
While undoubtedly offering protection against the misuse of ―private‖ information, an essential 
element of the claim was a disclosure of some kind. The tort was not created to protect those who 
guarded secrets, but those that entrusted them to others. Thus, for the purposes of recognizing a breach 
of confidentiality, the information was essentially immaterial with regard to content, and the focus of 
the tort was primarily on whether the information was imparted with an understanding that it be kept in 
confidence. Richards & Solove, Privacy‟s Other Path, supra note 40, at 166. But just because this is 
shown and the Coco factors are met does not necessarily mean a successful claim has been made; 
confidences that are contrary to the public interest by virtue of being criminal or tortious or which are 
already in the public domain will not be enforced. R.G. TOULSON & C.M. PHIPPS, CONFIDENTIALITY 
41 (1997). 
 44. See, e.g., Richards & Solove, Privacy‟s Other Path, supra note 40, at 166; Fenwick & 
Phillipson, Confidence and Privacy, supra note 33, at 447. 
 45. For example, the American right to privacy draws little or no distinction between information 
imparted to one or several individuals with an expectation of confidentiality and widespread 
publication of that information. Once others are let in on the information, American courts are 
reluctant to find it private. In direct contrast, English courts are much less willing to find that 
information loses its confidential nature simply because a few others may have viewed it. See Richards 
& Solove, Privacy‟s Other Path, supra note 40, at 159–60. In this way, English courts have protected 
some substantial privacy interests. The most famous is perhaps the court‘s protection of the details of a 
lesbian affair in which one of the parties was the lover of a married woman murdered by her husband 
after he discovered the two women in flagrante delicto. See Stephens v. Avery, [1988] F.S.R. 510, 518 
(holding that when information is ―communicated to the world,‖ it surrenders its confidential status, 
but ―this will not necessarily be the case if the information has previously only been disclosed to a 
limited part of the public‖). More recently, this conception of confidentiality has protected a famous 
actor‘s lawsuit to enjoin the publication of information and letters related to a homosexual affair which 
were provided by the actor‘s lover. See Barrymore v. News Group Newspapers, Ltd., [1997] F.S.R. 
600, 602 (Ch.)(U.K.) (holding that ―the information about the information is for the relationship and 
not for a wider purpose‖). 
 46. Gerald Dworkin, Notes of Cases, Privacy and the Press, 24 MOD. L. REV. 187, 187 (1961) 
(―Surely it is time it was realised in this country that it is necessary for certain interests in privacy to be 
protected legally and not confine this protection to parasitic damages arising out of defamation and 
damage to contract or property rights.‖); Brian Neill, The Protection of Privacy, 25 MOD. L. REV. 393, 
400 (1962) (―It seems remarkable that English law, which in many other fields has kept pace with 
changes in the public mores, should have so far failed to evolve any general concept of privacy.‖); T.L. 
Yang, Privacy: A Comparative Study of English and American Law, 15 INT‘L & COMP. L.Q. 175, 175 
(1966) (―The publication of private and personal affairs, often highly embarrassing and distressing, in 
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relationships, there was little or no redress in situations where an unknown 
party came by the information in the absence of such a relationship.
47
 This 
stands in contrast to the traditional American right to privacy.
48
 As early as 
1963, the English practice of stretching or failing to stretch the 
confidentiality doctrine to fit clear violations of privacy was viewed by 
some as impractical.
49
 And with the resurgence of tabloid journalism of 
the same sort decried by Warren and Brandeis in their seminal article, 
 
 
the gossip columns of some newspapers is not controlled in any way by our law.‖). But see Raymond 
Wacks, The Poverty of “Privacy”, 96 LAW Q. REV. 73, 74 (1980) (arguing that ―the concept of 
‗privacy‘ be refused admission to English law‖). 
 47. Richards & Solove, Privacy‟s Other Path, supra note 40, at 166. 
 48. Protection against the public disclosure of private facts lay at the heart of the American 
privacy tort at its inception. See Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 
HARV. L. REV. 193, 216 (1890) ([―T]he matters of which the publication should be repressed may be 
described as those which concern the private life, habits, acts, and relations of an individual.‖). Of 
course, Warren and Brandeis conceived of an exception for newsworthiness or matters traditionally 
believed to be in the public interest, such as when the individual was a public official and the facts 
pertained to his official duties. Id. (noting that to be unlawful, the private facts disclosed must ―have 
no legitimate connection with his fitness for a public office which he seeks or for which he is 
suggested‖ and no ―bearing upon any act done by him in a public or quasi-public capacity‖). This 
conception was also adopted by William Prosser. See William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 
383 (1960). In his seminal article ―Privacy,‖ widely considered to be second only to Warren & 
Brandeis‘s piece in its influence, Prosser consolidated several decades‘ worth of research and 
observations on privacy from his casebooks and treatises to argue that the ―right to privacy‖ was in 
fact four distinct torts: (1) Intrusion upon the plaintiff‘s seclusion or solitude, or into his private affairs; 
(2) Public disclosure of embarrassing facts about the plaintiff; (3) Publicity which places the plaintiff 
in a false light in the public eye; and (4) Appropriation, for the defendant‘s advantage, of the plaintiff‘s 
name or likeness. Id. at 389. This doctrinal understanding of the privacy tort has been embedded into 
American law through both case law and the Second Restatement of Torts. See Hamburger v. 
Eastman, 106 N.H. 107, 206 A.2d 239 (1964); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A (1977). For 
a detailed discussion of the evolution of American privacy law, see Neil M. Richards & Daniel J. 
Solove, Prosser‟s Privacy Law: A Mixed Legacy, 98 CAL. L. REV. 1887 (2010). Conceivably, Mosley 
could have brought suit under the intrusion or public disclosure theories of the tort had he been in the 
United States. One could even make a case for false light because of the ―Nazi‖ characterization of the 
events. Of course, these claims in an American court, especially coming from a celebrity, would likely 
be trumped today by the newspaper‘s reliance on the First Amendment‘s protection of freedom of the 
press. This is especially true after cases such as Smith v. Daily Mail, 443 U.S. 97 (1979), Florida Star 
v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524 (1989), and Bartnicki v. Vopper, 523 U.S. 514 (2010), which, while not laying 
down a bright-line rule, indicate that the state cannot punish the publication of lawfully obtained 
information of public interest. See Neil M. Richards, The Puzzle of Brandeis, Privacy, and Speech, 63 
VAND. L. REV. 1295, 1345 (2010). 
 49.  
The English Courts have even gone to greater extremes to give protection where they 
obviously realize protection should exist, and in consequence have bent the existing law 
considerably in the process. It would appear that the far simpler expedient of calling ―a spade 
a spade‖ would afford greater protection and give to other hesitant judges throughout the 
world the courage to forge new paths into the apparent wilderness of privacy.  
Weeks, supra note 34, at 490. 
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―The Right to Privacy,‖50 the shortcomings of relying on confidentiality 
and a patchwork of other rights became all too apparent.
51
 
The most notorious judicial rejection of a stand-alone right to privacy 
in English law occurred in the 1991 case of Kaye v. Robertson.
52
 In Kaye, 
a celebrity
53
 recovering from brain injuries sustained in a car accident was 
photographed and ―interviewed‖ by a tabloid journalist while only 
partially conscious. The journalist gained entry to the hospital room 
through deception, and Kaye vainly sought an injunction to prevent 
publication of the story and images.
54
 In denying the remedy, the court 
acknowledged that Kaye had experienced ―a monstrous invasion of his 
privacy.‖55 Despite this, the court concluded that by itself, ―this invasion 
of his privacy which underlies the plaintiff‘s complaint . . . . does not 
entitle him to relief in English law.‖56 Understandably, there was a great 
degree of public disappointment in the decision, and it contributed 
significantly to calls for change in the law.
57
 
The holding in Kaye was subsequently upheld in another case that 
highlighted the detrimental results of rejecting a right to privacy. In 
 
 
 50. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 48, at 196 (―The press is overstepping in every direction the 
obvious bounds of propriety and of decency . . . . To satisfy a prurient taste the details of sexual 
relations are spread broadcast in the columns of the daily papers.‖) 
 51. See Sara Haenggi, The Right of Privacy Is Coming to the United Kingdom: Balancing the 
Individual‟s Right to Privacy from the Press and the Media‟s Right to Freedom of Expression, 21 
HOUS. J. INT‘L L. 531, 555–57 (1999) (lamenting that ―substantial social harm has resulted from 
invasive journalism in the United Kingdom‖ and arguing for a statutory or judicial right to privacy). 
 52. [1991] F.S.R. 62 (C.A.) (U.K.). 
 53. Actor Gordon Kaye, a well-known British sitcom star. See id. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. at 70. The court continued its moral condemnation of the journalist‘s invasion of Kaye‘s 
privacy in a thinly veiled message to Parliament, insisting that ―[i]f ever a person has a right to be let 
alone by strangers with no public interest to pursue, it must surely be when he lies recovering from 
brain surgery and in no more than partial command of his faculties,‖ even as it nonetheless denied the 
victim his injunction. Id. In the end, the only remedy afforded Kaye was one for ―malicious falsehood‖ 
on the part of the reporter, and this consisted of preventing any inference in the publication of the 
material that Kaye had given his informed consent to it. Id. As one of the frustrated justices lamented, 
the case ―highlights, yet again, the failure of both the common law of England and statute to protect in 
an effective way the personal privacy of individual citizens.‖ Id. 
 56. Id. In contrast, Kaye‘s case most likely could have been addressed through the American 
privacy torts of intrusion or appropriation. See, e.g. Barber v. Time, Inc., 159 S.W.2d 291, 295 (1942) 
(holding that the unauthorized photograph taken of a woman in the hospital used for an article about 
her medical condition was actionable). See also Prosser, supra note 48, at 392 (stating that when a 
plaintiff is ―confined to a hospital bed . . . the making of a photograph without his consent is an 
invasion of a private right, of which he is entitled to complain‖); Richards & Solove, Privacy‟s Other 
Path, supra note 40, at 167 (observing that Kaye‘s situation ―has traditionally been an easy case for 
American privacy law to protect.‖). 
 57. See Cardonsky, supra note 36, at 398–99; Ben Emmerson, Human Rights Are No Threat to 
Parliament, TIMES (LONDON), July 22, 1997, at 35 (referring to Kaye as a ―notorious decision‖); 
Bryan Schwartz, Fifth Column: Law and Society, GLOBE & MAIL (TORONTO), Sept. 15, 1992, at A24.  
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Wainwright v. Home Office,
58
 a woman and her handicapped son visiting a 
prison were improperly strip-searched by guards looking for drugs.
59
 They 
brought suit, alleging battery and trespass to person.
60
 Unlike the court in 
Kaye, the trial judge initially found for the plaintiffs, reasoning that 
trespass of the person implicated a common law right to privacy which 
had been violated in this case.
61
 However, this was quickly reversed by the 
Court of Appeals, which reiterated the holding in Kaye,
62
 finding that the 
only remedy available to the plaintiffs was battery.
63
 
The decision in Kaye not only affected public opinion, but also the 
views of a generation of young lawyers, some of whom are now judges.
64
 
The decision also sparked a resurgence of scholarly and Parliamentary 
consideration of an American-style privacy tort.
65
 But ironically, it seems 
as though these scholars were looking in the wrong direction: the seed of 
an English right to privacy was not to be found across the Atlantic, but 
across the channel in continental Europe. 
 
 
 58. [2001] EWCA (Civ) 2081, [2003] All E.R. 943 (U.K.). 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. 
 62. The decision of the Court of Appeals was ultimately affirmed by the House of Lords. [2003] 
UKHL 53, [2004] A.C. 406 (U.K.) (opinion of Mummery, L.J.): 
This claim fails as there is no tort of invasion of privacy. Instead, there are torts protecting a 
person‘s interests in the privacy of his body, his home, and his personal property. There is 
also available the equitable doctrine of breach of confidence for the protection of personal 
information, private communications, and correspondence.  
Id. at 57. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Basil Markesinis et al., Concerns and Ideas About the Developing English Law of Privacy 
(And How Knowledge of Foreign Law Might Be of Help), 52 AM. J. COMP. L. 133, 138 (2004) (―We 
have come across no judicial or academic dicta to suggest other than full condemnation of the 
unsatisfactory nature of the [Kaye] result (reluctantly) reached by a strong Court of Appeal.‖). Justice 
Eady was certainly among those affected. Stephen Sedley, Towards a Right to Privacy, LONDON REV. 
OF BOOKS, June 8, 2006; Profile, Mr. Justice Eady, supra note 19. Eady, then serving as a Recorder, 
the English title for a Magistrate or Local Judge, described the decision as ―a serious gap in the 
jurisprudence of any civilised society, if such a gross intrusion could happen without redress.‖ Id. See 
also Gibb, Lawyer Who Used to Act for the Red-Tops Became Judge Who Championed Privacy, supra 
note 19. 
 65. See, e.g., Peter Prescott, Kaye v. Robertson: A Reply, 54 MOD. L. REV. 451 (1991); Basil 
Markesinis, Our Patchy Law of Privacy—Time to Do Something About It, 53 MOD. L. REV. 802 
(1991). 
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II. THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS
 
 
AND THE ROAD TO MOSLEY 
The European Convention on Human Rights (―Convention‖) was 
adopted in 1950 to protect human rights and fundamental freedoms.
66
 By 
1980, scholars recognized its potential implications for a stand-alone 
English right to privacy.
67
 And by 1983, it was understood that the 
Convention was capable of providing non-binding guidance that would 
supply ―at least continued consideration of legal protection of privacy.‖68 
Article 8 of the Convention protects one‘s ―private and family life.‖69 The 
UK, as a signatory to the Convention, was required to respect this right in 
a general sense, but was under no obligation to give the Convention the 
force of law.
70
 
In 2000, the articles of the Convention ceased to be mere guiding 
principles and became part of British law under the Human Rights Act 
(―HRA‖).71 The law was passed by Parliament in 1998, but did not go into 
effect for two years.
72
 Though Parliament consistently rejected specific 
privacy statutes during the decades preceding the HRA,
73
 the new 
legislation declared it unlawful ―for a public authority to act in a way 
which is incompatible with a Convention right.‖74 Even before it went into 
effect, both government officials and scholars predicted that the HRA, and 
its incorporation of the Convention‘s Article 8 in particular, might have a 
significant effect on protections for privacy in England.
75
  
 
 
 66. European Convention on Human Rights, pmbl., Nov. 4, 1950 (characterizing the agreement 
as one dedicated to ―the maintenance and further realization of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms‖). 
 67. See Wacks, supra note 46, at 74 (speculating that ―the catalyst for change may, once again, 
be the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms‖ and presciently 
envisioning the Convention‘s adoption in a sort of ―British Bill of Rights‖). 
 68. David J. Seipp, English Judicial Recognition of a Right to Privacy, 3 OXFORD J. LEGAL 
STUD. 325, 351 (1983). 
 69. European Convention on Human Rights, § 1, art. 8, Nov. 4, 1950. 
 70. See Seipp, supra note 68, at 351. 
 71. Human Rights Act, 1998, c.42. 
 72. Basil Markesinis, et.al, Concerns and Ideas, supra note 64, at 138. 
 73. See Seipp, supra note 68, at 345–51 (detailing the history of failed legislative attempts at 
protecting privacy). 
 74. Human Rights Act, 1998, c.42, § 6(1). 
 75. As the Lord Chancellor noted, with the passing of the act, ―the judges are pen-poised to 
develop a right to privacy.‖ 583 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) (1997) 785. See also Haenggi, supra note 
51, at 564 (arguing that ―protection of the right to privacy in the United Kingdom is inevitable with the 
passage of the Human Rights Act‖). For a particularly prescient analysis of the HRA‘s effect, see 
generally Helen Fenwick & Gavin Phillipson, Breach of Confidence As a Privacy Remedy in the 
Human Rights Era, 63 MOD. L. REV. 660 (2000). 
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This turned out to be true, as judges faced with invasions of personal 
privacy suddenly found themselves armed with a new weapon that might 
help them avoid the widely condemned and inequitable result in Kaye.
76
 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, the vast majority of these new ―privacy‖ cases 
resulted from attempts by celebrities to prevent or be compensated for 
publication of information about their private lives. 
One of the first cases that the English courts faced after the passing of 
the HRA involved celebrities perhaps more familiar to an American 
audience than Gordon Kaye. In Douglas v. Hello!, Ltd,
77
 actors Michael 
Douglas and Catherine Zeta-Jones successfully won an injunction and 
damages against a tabloid magazine for publishing photographs of their 
wedding that had already been sold to a rival magazine.
78
 On appeal, the 
Court of Appeals denied the initial injunction as too restrictive on press 
freedom, but determined that it would allow an action for damages.
79
 
At first, it appeared as though this case would be the final word on 
privacy protection for publication of private facts. Lord Justice Sedley of 
the Court of Appeals, on the basis of the HRA, laid out a very direct 
argument for recognition of a right to privacy grounded in, and yet clearly 
distinct from, confidentiality.
80
 However, when the case was returned to 
the district court, Sedley‘s suggestion that privacy be the basis of recovery 
was rejected, and instead the court determined that confidentiality should 
 
 
 76. See Kathryn F. Deringer, Comment, Privacy and the Press: The Convergence of British and 
French Law in Accordance with the European Convention of Human Rights, 22 PENN. ST. INT‘L L. 
REV. 191, 209. Indeed, the language of the HRA essentially required judges to expand their 
understanding of confidentiality law in accordance with the Convention because the HRA defines 
―public authority‖ as including ―a court or tribunal.‖ Human Rights Act, 1998, c.42, § 6(2). 
 77. [2001] Q.B. 967 [hereinafter Douglas I]. 
 78. Id. Douglas and Zeta-Jones made an exclusive deal with OK! Magazine to cover their 
wedding for a fee of one million pounds. However, a paparazzo somehow gained entrance to the 
ceremony and less than twenty-four hours later, Hello! Magazine possessed several photographs of the 
wedding. Id. After OK! failed to obtain an injunction, Hello! published its pictures on the same day as 
OK!, ruining what would have been an OK! exclusive. The Douglasses sued Hello! for breach of 
privacy while OK! sued for the loss of its exclusive right to publish. Id. 
 79. Id. 
 80.  
Courts have done what they can, using such legal tools as were on hand, to stop the more 
outrageous invasions of individuals‘ privacy; but they have felt unable to articulate their 
measures as a discrete principle of law . . . Nevertheless, we have reached a point at which it 
may be said with confidence that the law recognizes and will appropriately protect a right of 
personal privacy . . . [T]he law has to protect not only those people whose trust has been 
abused but those who simply find themselves subjected to an unwanted intrusion into their 
personal lives. 
Douglas I, [2001] Q.B. 967, 997 (opinion of Sedley, L.J.). 
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remain the appropriate basis for any remedy.
81
 The opinion made sure to 
announce that although breach of confidence was affected by the HRA, the 
courts would most certainly not create a free-standing privacy right under 
English law.
82
  
After this holding, both courts and commentators quickly realized the 
difficulties in applying an ever more confusing doctrine of confidence to 
situations where the parties had little to no prior contact and thus no 
expectation of confidentiality from one another.
83
 The next leading case on 
English privacy sought to address this problem. In A v. B Plc,
84
 the court 
attempted to give some further guidelines to the burgeoning doctrine of 
privacy protection through the language of confidence; ultimately, the 
court essentially indicated that going forward, it would consider protecting 
privacy interests without explicitly categorizing them as such.
85
 
Arguably the most important case on the road to Mosley is Campbell v. 
Mirror Group Newspapers Ltd.
86
 Naomi Campbell, the famous 
 
 
 81. The Court applied Coco v. Clark and found the three factors were satisfied. Douglas v. Hello! 
Ltd., [2003] EWHC (Ch) 786, 182–86 [hereinafter Douglas II]. 
 82. Douglas I, [2001] Q.B. at 1053–54. 
 83. See Richards & Solove, Privacy‟s Other Path, supra note 40, at 170. 
 84. [2002] EWCA (Civ) 337; [2003] QB 195.  
 85. Judge Woolf first held that an independent right of privacy was unsupported, and despite the 
previous language indicating the contrary, in fact unnecessary. However, in so doing, he greatly 
expanded the doctrine of confidentiality by broadening the definition of ―confidence‖ itself:  
[T]he need for the existence of a confidential relationship should not give rise to problems as 
to the law . . . . a duty of confidence will arise whenever the party subject to the duty is in a 
situation where he either knows or ought to know that the other person can reasonably expect 
his privacy to be protected. 
Id. However, this expansion of confidence doctrine did little to help ―A,‖ otherwise known as Garry 
Flitcroft. The court determined that Flitcroft‘s fame and status as a ―role model‖ indicated that there 
was at least some level of public interest in his private affairs. Id. at 217. It also gave less weight to his 
interest in keeping the adultery confidential, holding that such non-marital relationships deserved less 
protection than ―the confidentiality which attaches to what is intended to be a permanent relationship.‖ 
Id. at 216. Flitcroft‘s confidentiality interests thus failed to outweigh the interest of the press in 
publishing the story, and it was not long before he was named in public. Neil Tweedie, Footballer 
Named After Losing Privacy Battle, DAILY TELEGRAPH (UK), Mar. 30, 2002, at 1. Flitcroft‘s status as 
a ―public figure‖ or ―role model‖ was not apparent to everyone in the press, however, and left some in 
England asking the same question that will almost certainly puzzle American readers of this Note. Neil 
Tweedie, Saga of the „Love Rat‟ Footballer Leaves One Question: Garry Who?, Midfielder Will Be a 
Legend Only in the Courtrooms, DAILY TELEGRAPH (UK), Mar. 30, 2001, at 11 (―Mention of 
Flitcroft‘s name in years to come is more likely to be made by law students than by admirers of the 
‗beautiful game.‘‖) 
 86. [2004] UKHL 22. Some observers have viewed this decision as marking the decisive point at 
which the courts realized the right at issue could be openly named and protected under a theory of 
privacy. See Frances Gibb, Privacy Law Is Not New—We‟ve Had It Since Naomi‟s Case, TIMES 
(LONDON), Dec. 4, 2008, at 83 (interviewing a distinguished defamation attorney who expresses 
confusion over the furor surrounding Mosley and argues that England has had a right to privacy ―at 
least since the case of Naomi Campbell‖). 
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supermodel, was photographed leaving a Narcotics Anonymous meeting, 
and the pictures were subsequently published in a tabloid story about her 
battle with drug addiction. She brought suit, alleging a violation of her 
privacy. After a series of appeals, the Law Lords
87
 again determined that 
there was no free-standing English right to privacy. However, the court 
engaged in a fascinating game of semantics, noting that: 
The continuing use of the phrase ‗duty of confidence‘ and the 
description of the information as ‗confidential‘ is not altogether 
comfortable. Information about an individual‘s private life would 
not, in ordinary usage, be called ‗confidential‘. The more natural 
description today is that such information is private. The essence of 
the tort is better encapsulated now as misuse of private 
information.
88
 
The Lords held that the initial showing must be ―whether in respect of 
the disclosed facts the person in question had a reasonable expectation of 
privacy.‖89 If so, then the Article 8 right to privacy and Article 10 right to 
free expression
90
 would have to be balanced against one another.
91
 
English courts‘ interpretations of Article 8 have not provided the sole 
impetus for the change in English privacy protection. Section 2 of the 
HRA requires that all English courts and tribunals take into account the 
decisions of the European Court of Human Rights (―ECHR‖) when 
interpreting provisions of the Convention.
92
 And the ECHR specifically 
addressed Article 8‘s requirements in Von Hannover v. Germany.93 In Von 
 
 
 87. Until 2009, the UK‘s highest court of appeals was comprised of the Lords of Appeal in 
Ordinary, commonly known as the Law Lords. Litigation: All Change At the Highest Court in the 
Land, LAWYER (UK), July 20, 2009, at 6. This was a branch of the House of Lords tasked with 
exercising its judicial functions. In October 2009, however, the Law Lords were replaced with a new 
Supreme Court of the United Kingdom, comprised of twelve justices. Id. 
 88. [2004] UKHL 22, [14] (opinion of Nicholls, L.J.). The opinion continued by advocating the 
recognition ―that the values enshrined in articles 8 and 10 are now part of the cause of action for 
breach of confidence.‖ Id. at [17]. However, it made sure to limit the privacy right to disclosure of 
private facts so as not to expressly overrule Wainwright, finding that ―[i]n the case of individuals this 
tort, however labelled, affords respect for one aspect of an individual‘s privacy. That is the value 
underlying this cause of action. An individual‘s privacy can be invaded in ways not involving 
publication of information. Strip-searches are an example.‖ Id. at [15]. 
 89. Id. at [21]. 
 90. ―Everyone has the right of freedom of expression.‖ European Convention on Human Rights, 
§ 1, art. 10, Nov. 4, 1950. 
 91. [2004] UKHL 22, [46] (opinion of Hoffman, L.J.). 
 92. ―A court or tribunal determining a question which has arisen in connection with a 
Convention right must take into account any . . . judgment, decision, declaration or advisory opinion of 
the European Court of Human Rights.‖ Human Rights Act 1998, c.4, § 2. 
 93. [2004] ECHR 294. 
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Hannover, the ECHR dealt with privacy claims made by Princess Caroline 
of Monaco.
94
 The case was unique because the Princess, as royalty and a 
celebrity, was very obviously a public figure,
95
 and the conduct 
complained of largely consisted of photography in public places. The 
German government argued that Article 10 of the Convention safeguarded 
the ability of the press to publish the pictures. The ECHR rejected this 
argument, holding that “anyone, even if they are known to the general 
public, must be able to enjoy a ‗legitimate expectation‘ of protection of 
and respect for their private life.‖96 
Soon after Von Hannover, in what would turn out to be an important 
preview of his decision in Mosley, Justice Eady dealt with a case 
implicating privacy rights in McKennitt v. Ash.
97
 In that case, the court 
demonstrated a high degree of deference for the Article 8 privacy right 
over Article 10 freedom of expression, rejecting Ash‘s ―public interest‖ 
argument.
98
 The court noted that Von Hannover drew ―a fundamental 
distinction between reporting facts capable of contributing to a debate in a 
democratic society . . . and reporting details of the private life of an 
individual who exercises no official functions.‖99 The McKennitt court 
accepted this distinction and held that information does not automatically 
become of public interest simply because of its attachment to someone 
famous. McKennitt required that English courts—unlike their American 
counterparts
100—conduct a searching inquiry into the context and content 
of the information to determine if it was truly ―confidential‖ and not 
simply defer to media determinations of newsworthiness.
101
 
The most immediate case preceding Mosley to extend England‘s 
privacy protection also met with considerable excitement and press 
 
 
 94. Id. The Princess‘s claims were initially brought against paparazzi that photographed her and 
her children as she picked them up from school and went about her daily business. Id. 
 95. Under German law, Princess Caroline was considered a ―public figure par excellence,‖ 
meaning that it was assumed under law that the public had a general interest in learning about how she 
conducted herself in public, regardless of whether she was serving any official function. Id. 
 96. Von Hannover, [2004] ECHR 294. 
 97. [2005] EWHC (QB) 3003. In McKennitt, Canadian singer Loreena McKennitt sought to 
enjoin the publication of a book a former friend had written. Niema Ash, the book‘s author, was an 
intimate friend of McKennitt until a sudden falling out. The court, with Justice Eady writing the 
opinion, granted the injunction. Id. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. 
 100. In the United States, courts generally defer to the press when considering whether a 
publication has the requisite degree of public interest to shield its publisher from liability. See 
Richards, supra note 48, at 1344. This circular understanding sharply limits the effectiveness of the 
American privacy tort because information published becomes, by definition, not private. See id. 
 101. Id. 
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coverage. In Murray v. Big Pictures (UK) Ltd.,
102
 Joanne Murray, better 
known to the world as J.K. Rowling,
103
 brought a privacy claim on behalf 
of her son after a newspaper published unauthorized pictures of him.
104
 
After initially being denied injunctive relief,
105
 on appeal the court 
reversed in favor of Murray.
106
 As one English attorney noted, ―[t]his case 
puts in place another building block in the gradual construction by the 
courts of a fully developed law of privacy.‖107 
III. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF MOSLEY 
By the time of Mosley, English law with respect to privacy had evolved 
a great deal. This evolution occurred particularly rapidly in the eight-year 
period that began with the adoption of the HRA. But these changes were 
halting and somewhat confused, with great uncertainty about what the law 
actually forbade, especially in light of potentially contradictory 
precedents.
108
 Just as Prince Albert v. Strange is looked to as the landmark 
 
 
 102. [2008] EWCA Civ 446. 
 103. Rowling is the author of the Harry Potter series and one of the richest women in Great 
Britain. Caroline Wilson, How Scottish Millionaires Regained Their Midas Touch, HERALD 
(GLASGOW), Mar. 21, 2011, at 9. 
 104. In November 2004 a photograph was taken by Big Pictures, an organization specializing in 
celebrity photos, of David in a stroller being pushed by his parents in an Edinburgh street. The 
photograph was subsequently published by the Sunday Express on April 3, 2005. [2008] EWCA Civ 
446. 
 105. The trial judge, while sympathetic to the claims, was caught up with trying to ―give effect to 
what I perceive to be the reason of the ECHR in Von Hannover where it appears to conflict with the 
decision of the House of Lords in Campbell,‖ and deferred to what he felt was the precedent of 
Campbell. [2007] EWHC 1908 (Ch). After wrestling with the cases, he determined that ―the law does 
not in my judgment (as it stands) allow [Murray‘s parents] to carve out a press-free zone for their 
children in respect of absolutely everything they choose to do.‖ Id. 
 106. ―If a child of parents who are not in the public eye could reasonably expect not to have 
photographs of him published in the media, so too should the child of a famous parent.‖ [2008] EWCA 
Civ 446. In reaching this decision and weighing the interests involved, the court appeared to be 
persuaded by several key facts. For one, it was imperative that the action was brought on behalf of 
David, and was not an action regarding the rights of his parents. Id. The court also found it important 
that the parents had ―repeatedly and consistently taken steps to secure and maintain the privacy of the 
Claimant and their other children in which they have been substantially successful,‖ even going so far 
as to make sure they were not in attendance for high-publicity events such as book signings. [2008] 
EWCA (Civ) 446. 
 107. Clare Dyer, JK Rowling Wins Ban on Photos of Her Son, GUARDIAN (UK), May 8, 2008, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/media/2008/may/08/privacy.medialaw. 
 108. Torin Douglas, Confusion Over Privacy Rulings, BBC NEWS, Mar. 30, 2002, http:// 
news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/1902279.stm (―Despite this week‘s court cases [of A v. B and 
Campbell], newspapers are still no clearer about where privacy starts and ends.‖); Sean O‘Neill, 
Privacy Law Confusion Grows, TIMES (LONDON), May 31, 2004, at 3 (discussing the different 
outcomes in Campbell and another case where the plaintiff failed to enjoin publication of an 
extramarital affair); Roy Greenslade, Confusion As Lords Reject Author‟s Right to Appeal, GUARDIAN 
(UK), Mar. 30, 2007, http://www.guardian.co.uk/media/greenslade/2007/mar/30/confusionaslords 
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case for English confidentiality law despite the existence of preceding 
cases touching on the theory, so should Mosley be seen as the hallmark 
case for an English right to privacy. 
The Mosley opinion begins with a reiteration of the principles 
established by Campbell, asserting that the law now affords protection to 
information where ―there is a reasonable expectation of privacy.‖109 The 
court could have easily relied on a more traditional theory of 
confidentiality in its opinion, but made a conscious choice to focus on and 
enhance the privacy aspect of the case.
110
 The court determined that 
Mosley had made a sufficient showing of ―a reasonable expectation,‖ 
opining that ―one is usually on safe ground in concluding that anyone 
indulging in sexual activity is entitled to a degree of privacy—especially if 
it is on private property and between consenting adults (paid or 
unpaid).‖111 In so doing, the court dismissed the argument that the 
commission of a crime constituted a per se matter of public interest which 
would trump the Article 8 concerns.
112
 It also acknowledged that there 
could be a public interest if the sexual acts had a Nazi overtone, but 
rejected that argument in the case at hand for lack of evidence.
113
 Although 
 
 
rejectauth (observing that even the McKennitt decision ―still leaves the whole business of where to 
draw the line between a right to privacy and a right to report in confusion‖). 
 109. Mosley, [2008] EWHC (UK) 1777, [7]. 
 110. As the court noted early in the opinion, it was alleged that ―there also had been a pre-existing 
relationship of confidentiality between the participants‖ in the sexual activities. Id. at [4]. This meant 
that the claim was at least partially founded in ―old-fashioned breach of confidence by way of conduct 
inconsistent with a pre-existing relationship, rather than simply of the purloining of private 
information.‖ Id. at [6] (quoting McKennitt v. Ash, [2008] QB 73, Buxton, L.J.). Eady then remarked 
that ―I would be prepared to hold that Woman E had committed an ‗old fashioned breach of 
confidence‘ as well as a violation of the Article 8 rights of all those involved.‖ Id. at [108]. However, 
the court chose to specifically focus on the private nature of the information and the Article 8 rights at 
issue, rather than impose liability based on the initial breach of confidence. 
 111. Id. at [98]. Further highlighting the fact that privacy, and not confidentiality, was the right at 
stake and not confidentiality is Mosley‘s stark difference from some of the rationale behind the 2002 A 
v. B. decision. [2002] EWCA (Civ) 337. In A v. B, the court looked at the link between the parties, 
ultimately determining that one of the reasons the information was not protected from publication was 
the non-marital relationship between Flitcroft and the two other women. See supra note 85 and 
accompanying text. In Mosley, the relationship was arguably much weaker because the woman who 
initially betrayed Mosley‘s confidence was a hired dominatrix and not even a long-term girlfriend. Yet 
the information and activity Mosley was protected because of its inherently private nature. Mosley, 
[2008] EWHC (QB) 1777, [125]. 
 112. Id. at [110]–[111]. The court rejects the notion that ―it will always be an automatic defence to 
intrusive journalism that a crime was being committed on private property, however technical or 
trivial,‖ with the rhetorical question of whether installing a camera in one‘s home to catch him 
smoking marijuana would be justified. Id. at [111]. It also extrapolates from the situation in Campbell, 
where the underlying fact implicit in the disclosure was that Naomi Campbell was using illegal drugs, 
to demonstrate that ―illegal behaviour does not automatically undermine a person‘s rights under 
Article 8.‖ Id. at [119]. 
 113. See supra note 8 and accompanying text. 
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the court refrained from awarding exemplary damages, its calculation of 
damages was not by any means a hard science, designed as it was ―for the 
purpose of acknowledging the infringement and compensating, to some 
extent, for the injury to feelings, the embarrassment and distress 
caused.‖114 
Mosley was skillfully grounded in recent precedent, but the court 
nonetheless managed to work in a few new aspects of privacy law. As an 
initial matter, the balancing test between Article 8 and 10 rights is now 
indisputably the means of determining whether there has been an 
actionable violation of one‘s privacy rights. Furthermore, there is now a 
strong presumption that sex acts, even those involving criminal activity, 
will tip the scale in favor of Article 8, provided the behavior does not 
amount to ―serious crimes‖ or sexual conduct involving ―any significant 
breach of the criminal law.‖115 Indeed, Mosley may stand not only for a 
right to information privacy, but for a broader principle of sexual privacy 
between consenting adults. 
Before Mosley, one could still make a straight-faced argument that 
there were some distinctions between how the English courts protected 
HRA privacy interests and the traditional American privacy tort of public 
disclosure of private facts. After Mosley, the difference has become strictly 
nominal. Though still technically grounded in ―confidence,‖ the doctrine 
has evolved to the point where a distinct right to privacy exists; regardless 
of celebrity status or whether a prior relationship with the discloser exists, 
anyone with a reasonable expectation of privacy who has private 
information taken and disseminated without his consent for reasons 
unrelated to the public interest can successfully sue for damages.
116
 And 
because this right is unchecked by any British equivalent to the First 
Amendment, England‘s privacy protections are now far greater than those 
of the United States.
117
 Mosley‘s effect was immediate, as other celebrities 
predictably took advantage of the ruling.
118
 Indeed, a member of the royal 
 
 
 114. Mosley, [2008] EWHC (QB) 1777, [235]. 
 115. Id. at [118], [127]. 
 116. Id. at [12]. 
 117. See supra note 48 and accompanying text. 
 118. Soon after the ruling was issued, Justice Eady was spared the duties of sitting in judgment of 
another celebrity‘s privacy complaints, as Sienna Miller‘s claims against News Group Newspapers and 
Big Pictures UK were quickly settled. Miller brought a claim for invasion of privacy against News 
Group Newspapers and Big Pictures UK for pictures taken by the latter and published by the former. 
She alleged that Big Pictures‘ photographers harassed and tailed her while she went about her daily 
business, and took unauthorized pictures of her while on a boat in Italy. News Group, along with The 
Sun, another English tabloid that published the pictures, settled the privacy claims for £35,000. Ben 
Dowell, Sienna Miller Paid £35,000 in Damages by Sun and News of the World, GUARDIAN (UK), 
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family explicitly relied on Mosley for a breach of privacy claim only a few 
months after the decision.
119
 
Mosley is also properly viewed as a landmark case because it captured 
the fascination of the public with its bizarre and intimate facts in a way 
that Douglas, Campbell, Murray, and McKennitt did not.
120
 Any one of 
those cases, it could be argued,
121
 had a similarly substantial impact in the 
formative process of the English right to privacy. Indeed, several 
commentators suggest that the heavy lifting for the decision in Mosley was 
performed as early as Douglas.
122
 Those cases, though, did not have the 
salacious and seedy context of Mosley, and were more or less 
straightforward instances of the general annoyance that celebrities endure 
from the paparazzi on an almost daily basis. Even Justice Eady had to 
admit the colorful and scandalous facts of Mosley‘s private life made for 
interesting reading.
123
 Those formative cases also did not provide the 
comprehensive synthesis of doctrine provided in Mosley, and if they did, 
they were immediately reversed.
124
 Most importantly, the other cases did 
 
 
Nov. 10, 2008, http://www.guardian.co.uk/media/2008/nov/10/privacy-sun. Big Pictures settled the 
claim for £53,000. Mark Sweney, Sienna Miller Gets £53k for Press Intrusion, GUARDIAN (UK), Nov. 
22, 2008, http://www.guardian.co.uk/media/2008/nov/22/privacy-privacy. Other celebrities who 
brought suits in the wake of Mosley and had them quickly settled include Madonna and soccer player 
Ashley Cole. Afua Hirsch, Judge in Max Mosley Trial Hits Back at Criticism Over Privacy Cases, 
GUARDIAN (UK), Dec. 1, 2009, http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2009/dec/01/david-eady-privacy-trials-
media. 
 119. Andrew Pierce, Duke Uses Mosley Sex Case to Protect the Royals Palace, Hopes Media Will 
Be Banned from Reporting Family‟s Private Lives, DAILY TELEGRAPH (UK), Aug. 7, 2008, at 7. The 
article reports the Duke of Edinburgh‘s Mosley-inspired privacy claim to the Press Complaint 
Commission after the Evening Standard published a story alleging that the Duke was suffering from 
prostate cancer. One of the article‘s sources declared that ―the Max Mosley ruling made the public 
interest case clear . . . . [i]t made clear that even they [the royals] have a right to privacy.‖ Id. 
 120. See Murray, Sex Scandal, supra note 17 (commenting on the public‘s enjoyment of ―every 
gory detail of the Max Mosley versus News of the World sado-masochistic sex scandal‖); Rowan 
Pelling, A Spanking Good Spectacle, THE DAILY TELEGRAPH (UK), July 12, 2008, at 23 (―The Mosley 
trial surely deserves a . . . place in the hallowed halls of British sexual infamy.‖); Rebecca Winters 
Keegan, Welcome to the Top 10 Everything of 2008, TIME, Nov. 5, 2008, at 47 (listing ―Max Mosley‘s 
Sex Romp‖ among the top ten scandals of the year). 
 121. Indeed, each of these cases has been touted at various times as the next big English privacy 
case. See generally Markesinis, et al., Concerns and Ideas, supra note 64, at 138. 
 122. Id. 
 123. In one of the opinion‘s lighter moments, Eady drily notes that: 
―[I]t is right to acknowledge that some of the young women playing the submissive role also 
developed a visible coloration of the buttocks. As Woman D accepted, it was painful—‗but in 
a nice way‘. Although no doubt interesting to the public, was this genuinely a matter of public 
interest? I rather doubt it.‖ Mosley, [2008] EWHC (QB) 1777, [114]. 
 124. See Andy McSmith, £60,000 for Mosley‟s Pain As Newspaper Loses Case, INDEPENDENT 
(UK), July 25, 2008, at 8 (noting that the ECHR argument for privacy had ―never been used before in 
a court case as sensational and highly publicised as the Mosley hearing‖). 
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not provide a potential stepping stone to a more expansive protection of 
privacy through prior restraints, which will be discussed in Part IV. 
Of course, the decision in Mosley has met with numerous detractors, 
and is perhaps not without some practical ill effects. Already, the editors 
of major newspapers in the United Kingdom have complained that their 
ability to run controversial stories and engage in serious investigative 
journalism has been constrained by the Mosley decision.
125
 Those who 
dislike the decision complain of a ―European right‖126 that has been thrust 
upon the unwilling British public by activist judges.
127
 This is countered 
by those who point to the English adoption of the HRA as Parliament‘s 
tacit approval of this development.
128
 Others have been more nuanced in 
their analysis, voicing approval of judicial punishment for the News of the 
World in this particular case while expressing some apprehension about 
the precedent that has been set.
129
 Nonetheless, while many commentators 
 
 
 125. See Brian MacArthur, Max Mosley Verdict Tightens Chains on the Press, DAILY TELEGRAPH 
(UK), July 24, 2008, at 26 (―Max Mosley‘s legal victory over the News of the World yesterday marks 
another step towards a body of precedents on privacy law created by judges rather than Parliament 
which threatens the freedom of the press.‖); Chris Tryhorn, Investigative Journalism Is Under Threat 
by Legal Actions, Editors Warn MPs, GUARDIAN (UK), May 5, 2009, http://www.guardian.co.uk/ 
media/2009/may/05/alan-rusbridger-ian-hislop (Alan Rusbridger and Ian Hislop, the respective editors 
of The Guardian and Private Eye, discussing the detrimental effect of privacy law on publishing 
stories on large companies and rich individuals.). 
 126. However, Article 8 of the HRA was drafted and introduced to the European Convention on 
Human Rights by the British delegation. See Roy Greenslade, Mosley Part Two: Is the Privacy 
Judgment a Genuine Threat to Press Freedom?, GUARDIAN (UK), July 30, 2008. Greenslade takes on 
the characterization of the ECHR as something wholly foreign to English law, noting that the 
Convention ―was largely a British legal construct, following the second world war, that one could say 
was foisted on Europe. The man who oversaw its drafting was none other than a Conservative 
politician, Sir David Maxwell Fyfe. At its heart were English, French, German and American concepts 
of civil liberties.‖ Id. 
 127. See supra note 27 and accompanying text; see also Mail Editor Accuses Mosley Judge, BBC 
NEWS, Nov. 10, 2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/7718961.stm. 
 128. See Chris Horrie, A Canny Kiss and Tell, GUARDIAN (UK), July 28, 2008, http://www. 
guardian.co.uk/media/2008/jul/28/mosley.newsoftheworld. (―[T]he financial penalties are by no means 
fatal, either for [News of the World editor Colin] Myler‘s career or for the fortunes of his paper. In 
short, this is very far from the end of the world for the News of the World.‖); David Sexton, Max Bolts 
the Bedroom Doors, EVENING STANDARD (LONDON), July 25, 2008, at 12 (―The judgment that Max 
Mosley had ‗a reasonable expectation of privacy‘ in relation to his sex life, however ‗unconventional,‘ 
seems right.‖). 
 129. Roy Greenslade of The Guardian has been foremost among those who see irresponsible 
journalism from tabloids like the News of the World as the root of the problem, but are nonetheless 
concerned about the direction of the law. See, e.g., Roy Greenslade, Why the News of the World Should 
Be Caned for Its Scandalous Errors, GUARDIAN (UK), http://www.guardian.co.uk/media/greenslade/ 
2008/jul/24/whythenewsoftheworldshou (―A rogue newspaper will go on invading the private lives of 
people by using ‗the public interest‘ as a defence for its intrusions. The loser will be other newspapers 
because, gradually, judges will develop a law on privacy that might well lead to a genuine denial of 
press freedom.‖); Greenslade, Mosley Part Two, supra note 126 (expressing a concern about prior 
restraints through the use of injunctions and blaming ―bad journalism without a shred of public interest 
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in the media are unhappy or unimpressed with the ruling, British public 
opinion seems largely sympathetic to Mosley‘s privacy claims.130 This 
approval was reflected by Parliament‘s willingness to hear out Mosley‘s 
argument for increased privacy protection.
131
 The English right to privacy, 
despite the best efforts of many in the media, remains popular. 
After Mosley, the press was far less confused, albeit more alarmed, 
about what kind of reporting could lead to privacy claims. However, the 
most dramatic concerns about the muzzling of the press are unwarranted, 
as several journalists have noted.
132
 For one thing, to couch the right 
protected in Mosley as a blanket allowance for public figures to engage in 
adultery without fear of media exposure is false. Mosley himself has 
admitted that if sexual activity is intertwined with or has some bearing on 
that person‘s public persona, it may well be within the public interest and 
therefore overcome Article 8‘s protection.133 
IV. MOSLEY V. UNITED KINGDOM 
Mosley‘s unwillingness to settle for victory in the English High Court 
provides perhaps the best reason why Mosley should be recognized as 
 
 
justification‖ by News of the World for the present confusion). Greenslade‘s views on the subject have 
been fairly consistent since he opined on the McKennitt decision, admitting that ―[t]here have been 
indefensible invasions of privacy for not good reason,‖ but that the media ―must not allow the courts to 
encroach on rights that prevent us from acting in the public interest.‖ Roy Greenslade, Mail on Sunday 
Right to Raise Alarm Over Privacy, GUARDIAN (UK), June 14, 2007, http://www.guardian.co.uk/ 
media/greenslade/2007/jun/14/mailonsundayrighttoraise. 
 130. Jonathan Coad, Where is the Law of Privacy After Mosley?, MONDAQ, Sept. 3, 2008, http:// 
www.mondaq.com/article.asp?articleid=65690 (noting that over 90% of the public comments on news 
websites and blogs were supportive of the outcome in Mosley); Roy Greenslade, Mosley Was Right to 
Sue—But Now I Fear MPs Are Closer to Backing a Privacy Law, EVENING STANDARD (LONDON), 
Mar. 11, 2009, at 34 (finding evidence of public support for the right to privacy in the unanimous 
agreement of over 100 postgraduate journalism students with the Mosley holding). Since the Kaye 
decision and the papparazi‘s involvement in the 1997 death of Princess Diana, there seems to have 
been a fairly strong shift in public opinion against the sensational and intrusive tabloid journalism of 
the ―Red Tops.‖ See Haenggi, supra note 51, at 555 (noting in 1999 that ―[i]t is fair to conclude that 
the objective and reasonable UK citizen believes there is a need to increase protection of an 
individual‘s private life‖); The Crown Tarnished Before Our Eyes, OBSERVER (LONDON), Sept. 7, 
1997, at 7 (opining that the great imbalance in favor of the press at the expense of individual privacy 
―no longer corresponds to the core values of British society‖). 
 131. See Greenslade, Mosley Was Right, EVENING STANDARD (LONDON), Mar. 11, 2009, 
http://www.thisislondon.uk/standard-business/article23660643-mosley-was-right-to-sue---but-now-i-
fear-mps-are-closer-to-backing-a-privacy-law.do (expressing concern that Mosley‘s ―impressive 
performance‖ at a Parliamentary hearing likely ―won over many MPs to his point of view‖). 
 132. See Mosley‟s Libel Manouvre Puts Right to Privacy Back in Spotlight, LAWYER (UK), Aug. 
4, 2008, at 32 (echoing Eady‘s assertion that ―it cannot reasonably be suggested that [Mosley] will 
inhibit serious investigative journalism‖). 
 133. Linda Pressly, Max Mosley‟s Battle for Privacy, BBC NEWS (Feb. 17, 2009, 1:06 AM), http: 
//news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/7892702.stm. 
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England‘s landmark privacy case. Mosley has served as the launching pad 
for multiple legal salvoes in a campaign for greater protections of 
privacy.
134
 But the most prominent of these is undoubtedly the complaint 
that Mosley submitted to the ECHR.
135
 With Mosley v. United Kingdom, 
Mosley hoped to impose a legal duty on newspapers and other major 
media sources to notify subjects of their investigations before going to 
press with potentially private information.
136
 Once notified, those 
individuals would have the opportunity to seek injunctions restricting or 
limiting publication. In a country that has a long history of open 
journalism and a free press, but no equivalent to the sacrosanct American 
First Amendment, these potential changes raised major alarms in the press 
and elicited concern even among those untroubled by the privacy 
protections recognized in Mosley‘s domestic lawsuit.137 
The ECHR concluded deliberations on the merits of Mosley‘s appeal 
after conducting hearings on January 11, 2011.
138
 But the issues of prior 
notification and injunctive relief are not new ones for the English media.
139
 
For a time, it looked as though Mosley v. United Kingdom might prove 
 
 
 134. Mosley followed his success in his English privacy action with actions against other 
European papers that had published the story. Burden, supra note 29, at 26 (discussing Mosley‘s 
lawsuits in Italy, Germany, and France). Some of these suits were settled out of court, most likely 
because of Mosley‘s success in England. Mosley, German Publisher Settle Lawsuit, USA TODAY, 
Aug. 7, 2009, http://www.usatoday.com/sports/motor/formula1/2009-08-07-mosley-lawsuit_N.htm. In 
addition to this, Mosley seized on the court‘s determination that there was ―no truth‖ to the Nazi-theme 
claim in bringing a more traditional suit for defamation against News of the World. Oliver Luft, Max 
Mosley Launches Libel Action Against News of the World, GUARDIAN (Apr. 3, 2009, 11:13 AM), http: 
//www.guardian.co.uk/media/2009/apr/03/max-mosley-news-of-the-world. 
 135. See Mosley v. United Kingdom, App. No. 48009/08, Statement of Facts, supra note 29.  
 136. The ―Questions to the Parties‖ for the case lists three issues for review. The first is whether 
Mosley‘s recovery of GBP 60,000 sufficiently redresses his injury. Id. The second is the most 
controversial. It asks the court to determine whether the British government should have ―a positive 
obligation to protect the applicant‘s privacy by providing for a legal duty (‗notification requirement‘) 
on the News of the World to warn him in advance of publication in order to allow him to seek an 
interim objection.‖ Id. The court must also decide if such a duty would ―strike the correct balance 
between the interests protected under Article 8 and freedom of expression as guaranteed by Article 10 
of the Convention.‖ Id. The final question is directly tied to the first two, and asks whether Mosley had 
―an effective domestic remedy for his complaint‖ under Article 8 and Article 13. Id. 
 137. See Roy Greenslade, Why Max Mosley Is Right—and Wrong, GUARDIAN (UK) (Oct. 20, 
2008, 10:38 AM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/media/greenslade/2008/oct/20/newsoftheworld-pressand 
publishing. (―Once again, it is hard not to reflect that a meretricious piece of journalism could lead to 
the enactment of a law that, in theory at least, could hobble responsible journalism.‖) 
 138. Press Release, European Court of Human Rights, Chamber Hearing (Jan. 11, 2011), 
available at http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?action=open&documentId=879773&portal= 
hbkm&source=externalbydocnumber&table=F69A27FD8FB86142BF01C1166DEA398649. 
 139. See Simon Carr, Has He Got News for You About Privacy, INDEPENDENT (UK), May 6, 
2009, at 10 (discussing the increasing frequency of demands from targets of investigative journalism 
seeking to know the exact content of the pending news story and then procuring preliminary 
injunctions in a form of ―censorship by judicial process‖). 
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unnecessary, as judges grew more willing in the wake of Mosley and 
McKenitt to grant preliminary injunctions on publication of private 
facts.
140
 However, these cases all involved instances where the plaintiff 
was notified of publication as a matter of courtesy or discovered the 
pending publication through affirmative means.
141
 In addition, the English 
judiciary has indicated that it will not simply acquiesce to a de facto 
system of prior restraints through preliminary injunctions. Recently, a 
―super-injunction‖142 was lifted by the High Court, allowing the media to 
break the John Terry scandal that made headlines across Europe.
143
 In a 
repudiation of prior restraints, the court prevented the Chelsea FC and 
England captain from enjoining the publication of a story detailing his 
affair with a teammate‘s girlfriend.144 However, the court explained that 
the primary reason it was lifting the injunction was because Terry had 
failed to demonstrate that he was actually concerned about his privacy and 
not merely concerned with losing sponsorship deals.
145
 
Nevertheless, what the Terry case demonstrates is that the right to 
privacy recognized in Mosley is one more likely to be protected after the 
fact of publication, rather than with preliminary injunctions.
146
 Though the 
 
 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. 
 142. ―Superinjunctions‖ or ―Super-Injunctions‖ are injunctions so secret that they prevent the 
gagged party from even reporting that there has been a court order. Robert Verkaik, John Terry‟s 
„Affair‟ with Team Mate‟s Girlfriend Revealed, INDEPENDENT (UK), Jan. 30, 2010, at 2. 
 143. Unlike Garry Flitcroft, see supra note 85, John Terry is an unmistakable soccer star, known 
by millions around the globe for captaining the high-profile soccer club Chelsea FC and the England 
National Team. 
 144. In January of 2010, Terry, who is married with two young children, was revealed to have had 
an affair with an England and Chelsea teammate‘s long-term girlfriend. Verkaik, supra note 142. 
Compounding Terry‘s shame and the media‘s glee was the footballer‘s status as ―Dad of the Year‖ 
after a contest the year before. Amelia Hill, Shamed Terry Stands to Lose Millions Over Affair‟s 
Revelation, OBSERVER (LONDON), Jan. 31, 2010, at 9. A week after the story broke, Terry was stripped 
of his England captaincy. Owen Gibson & Dominic Fifeld, Capello Tells Terry: It‟s Over, GUARDIAN 
(UK), Feb. 6, 2010, at 1. Terry was subsequently reinstated as captain over a year after the scandal. 
Sam Wallace, Defiant, Unapologetic and Emotional: Terry Snatches Back England Armband, 
INDEPENDENT (UK), Mar. 23, 2011, at 54. 
 145. Terry v. Persons Unknown, [2010] EWHC 119 (QB), [95]. 
 146. This reluctance to impose prior restraints might explain a few of the outlier opinions during 
the creation of the privacy right. See, e.g., A v. B Plc, [2002] EWCA (Civ) 337; Deborah Orr, Do 
Adulterers Have a Right to Privacy, INDEPENDENT (UK), June 1, 2004, at 33 (discussing the failure of 
Lord Coe to obtain an injunction to prevent the exposure of his adulterous affair). Mosley himself was 
unable to restrain the initial publication of the News of the World story and yet won his action for 
damages. Nevertheless, Terry will have a difficult road even if he brings an action for damages after 
publication. The privacy interest he allegedly asserted was not concern for his home and family life, 
the protection specifically enumerated in Article 8 of the Act, but the fear of losing his many lucrative 
product endorsement deals (which has since happened). Terry, [2010] EWHC 119 (QB), [95]. 
Moreover, there is a strong argument that the publication was in the public interest (unlike in Mosley) 
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courts have yet to clearly outline a separate standard, in practice it seems 
as though they have created a system whereby preliminary injunctions 
receive a form of ―heightened scrutiny,‖ in order to avoid unnecessarily 
censoring speech before it occurs.
147
 Of course, this has not stopped at 
least twenty of these injunctions from being issued, much to the disgust of 
the English press.
148
  
Mosley v. UK offered the ECHR an opportunity to fully embrace 
injunctive relief as the appropriate remedy for invasions of privacy by 
requiring prior notification. However, in recognition of the need for 
judicial discretion and the danger to free speech, the ECHR issued its 
opinion on May 10, 2011, holding that: 
The limited scope under article 10 for restrictions on the freedom of 
the press to publish material which contributes to debate on matters 
of general public interest must be borne in mind. Thus, having 
regard to the chilling effect to which a pre-notification requirement 
risks giving rise, to the significant doubts as to the effectiveness of 
any pre-notification requirement and to the wide margin of 
appreciation in this area, the court is of the view that article 8 does 
not require a legally binding pre-notification requirement.
149
  
The decision dealt only with the issue of prior notification and did not 
explicitly address the appropriateness or desirability of super-injunctions, 
other than to recognize their existence as a remedy.
150
 Practically, though, 
the imposition of a system of prior notification would have made 
injunctive relief the first and natural remedy of choice for invasions of 
privacy. So though the granting of super-injunctions may continue, the 
ECHR has now clearly stated that such a system is not required by the 
Convention, especially in light of its potential ―chilling effect.‖ 
 
 
because the affair had potential implications for Terry‘s ability to lead England in the World Cup and 
affected whether his ex-teammate, Wayne Bridge, would be selected for the squad. 
 147. See supra note 127 and accompanying text. 
 148. See Stephen Glover, Silenced in Court, MIRROR (UK), Apr. 5, 2011, at 8 (estimating at least 
twenty super-injunctions in the eighteen months preceding the article and describing some of the 
cases); John Kampfner, The Worrying Rise of the Rich Man‟s Weapon of Justice, INDEPENDENT (UK), 
Apr. 1, 2011, at 14 (summarizing facts of some of the super-injunction cases without disclosing the 
protected information); Robin Callendar Smith, Privacy Law Is Madness, EXPRESS (UK), Apr. 17, 
2011, http://www.express.co.uk/posts/view/241270/ (arguing that super-injunctions to cover up 
celebrity scandals are inappropriate because ―nearly everyone in the media knows their identities‖). 
 149. Mosley v. United Kingdom, App. No. 48009/08, Judgment, May 10, 2011, [132], available 
at http://www.bailii.org/eu/cases/ECHR/2011/774.html. 
 150. Mosley v. UK, supra note 140, [119]. 
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In the months before and after the ECHR‘s decision, there has been 
spirited debate in the UK over the appropriateness of prior restraints in 
disclosure cases.
151
 Indeed, several commentators persuasively echo Judge 
Eady‘s observation in Mosley that damages cannot truly compensate an 
invasion of privacy.
152
 But a mandate from the ECHR in Mosley v. United 
Kingdom requiring prior notification would have firmly entrenched a 
regime of secret prior restraints. Such a decision would have been 
unnecessary and undesirable at this time. Super-injunctions are hugely 
controversial, and following Mosley‘s appeal, a special governmental 
committee was formed to examine concerns over the practice.
153
 Even 
more recently, super-injunctions awarded to a BBC interviewer
154
 and a 
famous British soccer star
155
 have figured prominently in both British and 
American headlines. In both situations, the existence of the injunction was 
news in and of itself that almost overshadowed the underlying disclosure 
of private information.
156
 The rise of the twitter or blog exposé has called 
into question whether privacy injunctions can be enforced in a meaningful 
way.
157
 Finally, the right to prior notification and restraint sought in 
 
 
 151. See, e.g., Emine Saner, Sex and the Public Interest: The Conversation, GUARDIAN (UK), Feb. 
12, 2011, at 34 (transcribing a friendly debate between Mosley and journalist Roy Greenslade on the 
merits of prior notification). 
 152. For a compilation of the arguments asserting the inadequacy of damages as a remedy for 
invasions of privacy, see Gavin Phillipson, Max Mosley Goes to Strasbourg: Article 8, Claimaint 
Notification, and Interim Injunctions, 1 J. MEDIA L. 73, 74–78 (2009). For the contrary position, see 
generally Andrew Scott, Prior Notification in Privacy Cases: A Reply to Professor Phillipson, 2 J. 
MEDIA L. 49 (2010). In Mosley v. UK, the ECHR straddled both positions. It recognized the obvious 
fact that privacy itself cannot be restored by damages after an invasion. Mosley v. UK, supra note 140, 
[72] (―[I]t is clear that no sum of money awarded after disclosure of the impugned material could 
afford a remedy in respect of the specific complaint advanced by the applicant.‖). But the court also 
noted its own implicit acceptance ―that ex post facto damages provide an adequate remedy for 
violations of Article 8 rights arising from the publication by a newspaper of private information.‖ Id. at 
[120]. 
 153. MASTER OF THE ROLLS, REPORT OF THE SUB-COMMITTEE ON SUPER-INJUNCTIONS: SUPER-
INJUNCTIONS, ANONYMISED INJUNCTIONS, AND OPEN JUSTICE, May 20, 2011, available at http:// 
www.scribd.com/doc/55877906/Super-Injunction-Report-20052011. 
 154. See Rob Hastings, Marr “Prepared to Walk Away from Gagging Order”, INDEPENDENT 
(UK), Apr. 26, 2011, at 22. 
 155. Despite the widespread availability of overseas reports and internet gossip about Manchester 
United star Ryan Giggs‘s extra-marital affair, the British press were prevented from reporting it until a 
member of Parliament took advantage of parliamentary immunity from the gag order and named Giggs 
in the midst of committee hearings on the propriety of super-injunctions. Sarah Lyall, Parliament 
Joins the Fray As Twitter Tests a Law, N.Y. TIMES, May 24, 2011, at A4; Patrick Wintour & Dan 
Sabbagh, Privacy Laws in Chaos As MP Names Giggs Over Injunction, GUARDIAN (UK), May 24, 
2011, at 1. 
 156. See Ravi Somaiya, British Law Used to Shush Scandal Has Become One, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 
27, 2011, at A4. 
 157. See id. (―[I]n a world where millions converse on Facebook, Twitter, and the like, the law 
cannot feasibly enforced online.‖). Despite the difficulty of enforcement, though, British courts appear 
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Mosley v. United Kingdom does not appear to enjoy the same degree of 
popular support as the retrospective right to privacy recognized in Mosley 
v. News Group Newspapers.
158
 Ultimately, the ECHR correctly recognized 
the unsettled role of privacy injunctions and the potential danger they pose 
to freedom of expression in its decision not to require prior notification. 
For the time being, Max Mosley‘s crusade for greater privacy protections 
has stalled.CONCLUSION 
The Mosley court insisted that it was not making new law. But while 
the doctrinal and interpretive analysis was created in a series of cases 
leading up to it, Mosley marks the furthest extent of the English right to 
privacy to date. After almost a century of discussion about how such a 
right might be implemented, an unlikely combination of English common 
law, European statute, and perhaps even some American theory have 
coalesced in the last ten years to provide more meaningful protection and 
control over private information. Mosley is the culmination of that 
movement. Because of its clear articulation of the interests at stake, its 
colorful and memorable facts, the unprecedented amount of recovery, the 
issues of prior notification raised in its subsequent appeal to the European 
Court of Human Rights, and perhaps even because of the panicked 
response that the case drew from the press, Mosley is a true landmark of 
English jurisprudence.  
James E. Stanley  
 
 
to be making an attempt. See Paul Calahan, Court Forces Twitter to Hand Over User‟s Details, 
INDEPENDENT (UK), May 30, 2011, at 6. 
 158. One tabloid-sponsored poll found that 79% of 2,004 individuals agreed that ―the use of 
‗super-injunctions‘ against the Press shows there is one law for the rich, another for the rest of us.‖ 
Vincent Moss, Gagging Orders „Prove There‟s One Law for Rich‟, SUNDAY MIRROR (UK), May 15, 
2011, at 6. A poll on The Guardian‘s website echoes this sentiment, with 68% of respondents asserting 
that super-injunctions are never justified. Are Superinjunctions Ever Justified?, GUARDIAN (UK), Apr. 
26, 2011, http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/poll/2011/apr/26/superinjunctions-justified. 
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